work paper presented for ‘Freiheit und Sicherheit in der Internationalen Politik nach  dem 11 SeptemberEine Transatlantische Perspektive

Coordinator  Dr.HASENKAMP, Miao-ling,
Referent : GAGELEA George
( erasmus fellowship student)
Sommersemester2007

I     Introduction- A PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM

What is terrorism? Difficult to define it. In my opinion terrorism is more like a  doctrine, because it tends not only to give strong explanations to its aims(that are  put in a very complicated ideology, can we speak of a terrorism ideology?) but more important  its achievements must( strictly) became reality in a violent way. The first characteristic of terrorism movement is its surprise, as nobody or no states  is conscious of its existence. Terrorism is a movement, is a group movement, that does not characterize a state, but people from one state; normally in international arena no state is considered  a terrorist one.
The aim of this paper is to present the reactions of European Union towards terrorism-a new challenge  for a very complicated organization that- wanted or not-plays one of the most important role in international arena. Terrorism is important as it  influence the equilibrium of the system changing the role of others in favor of others. Terrorism is an attitude.
The resources used here are both from internet-studies, commentaries- but I also udes ‘ classical’ books.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, those from May 11, 2004 in Madrid like those of Karachi or Bali showed that the terrorist threat intensifies and globalizes. The two series of attack of July 2005, which occurred in the United Kingdom, confirm that we are faced with a perennial phenomenon  that  Europe cannot regard itself as safe from this type of aggressions. The domestic terrorism, as that of Spain (Basque terrorism of ETA), or France (Corsican terrorism), or Germany (terrorism of extreme left of FRG), or  the United Kingdom (Irish terrorism) is known for a long time in Europe.
On the contrary, what I present here  distinguishes largely from these more traditional forms of aggressions which propose to achieve precise goals by means of targeted violent actions and/or of limited amplitude. The terrorist phenomenon is thus in change, and the difficulty to answer it holds to a large extent so that this one is attacked with method with the vulnerabilities of the Western democracies.
It bets on the media and emotional repercussion which will be able to give the world system media the terrorist acts that it proposes to achieve. The symbolic system, the calendar, the type of attack, the reference to Al-Qaida are thus element-key of “success” for such operations. Actually, if the contemporary terrorist threat offers new characteristics, it is also  because the strategic environment itself evolved/moved considerably. But it is also because the will and the objectives of the terrorist cells knew a scaling. For this reason the attacks of September 11 are not only the manifestation of new logical which structure the field of the international terrorism, they also have  a federator effect, mobilizing through world of the very diverse groups which by terrorist acts were incorporated – and still join today  – to the nebula of Al-Qaida contributing to make an imperceptible movement of it. The terrorists initially showed on September 11, 2001 that they had the will and the capacity to cause destruction of mass. The logic of this terrorism escapes thus from the principles clausewitziens from limitation in the use of the force: the number of victims and the disastrous consequences of the aggression are not only included/understood like inevitable collateral damage, but they represent from now on one of the principal objectives of it. World and transnational character of this terrorist threat induced a new dimension in the strategic situation with which we are confronted as well in term of capacity to mobilize means as in term of prevention and response to these aggressions. The terrorist movements have indeed from now on important resources which enable them to maintain a complex network in multiple countries and to consider attacks without frontier restriction. From this new total threat, it results – in others – an upheaval from the dividing line between the concepts of internal safety and external, inherent safety with the definition even of the antiterrorist fight.

II    Reactions of  EUROPEAN UNION
Ten days after the attacks of September 11, the European Council adopted a “action plan” as regards antiterrorist fight. This plan was brought up to date at an extraordinary meeting of the Ministers of Interior Department which proceeded after the attacks from March 8 in Madrid. In the field of the interior affairs , the measurements taken on this occasion are supposed to build a legal framework to found the antiterrorist actions on the European level.
In the field of the legal co-operation, this plan aims in particular the goals which follows  Eurojust unit (instituted on February 28, 2002) which  aim is  the improvement of the coordination of the investigations and the continuations in the Member States as well as the facilitation of the implementation of the international judicial cooperation. Does Eurojust have  support from  the authorities of the Member States to reinforce the effectiveness of their investigations? Will the European warrant for arrest have to replace the procedures of extradition traditionally subjected to political control?

Moreover, decisions aims to define a common minimal threshold for the sorrows and applicable sanctions in the event of terrorist infringements.  In  the field of the police co-operation, the plan envisage three types of measurement.The widening of the mandate of the European Office of police force (Europol), as well as the considerable increase in the human and material means available to the Office. The Council also requested the constitution of a European team of the chiefs of police force gathering the European directors of police force from the head office of Europol (December 2001) for an improvement of the experience sharing and information. The “task force” is also charged to develop plans and intervention in the event of terrorist actions in Europe.The regular update of a black list of the terrorist organizations – which was already created.On the more particular topic of the exchange of information between the Member States of the EU, the Council envisages in particular meetings with regular intervals of the chiefs of the antiterrorist units of the Member States, as well as their services of information. Moreover, measures were taken to simplify the access of the Information system Schengen (LOCATED) to the services of national information.
The fight against the financing of terrorism also progressed:  the Commission and the European Parliament really take for the first time counts of  terrorist dimension of it, through the new third directive on the money bleaching which is currently in preparation. This text will stress the monitoring of the transfers of cash to the borders external of the Union, the exchanges of information on the suspect movements, and the regulation of the field of the charitable and humane organizations. It will also encourage the practical installation of procedures of coordination and exchange as well as the development of CELLS OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION  in each Member State and the co-operating countries with the EU.
The directive rests on “40 + 8 recommendations” of the Group of International Financial Action against the bleaching of capital (GAFI). In 2001, the group made eight recommendations special on the financing of terrorism, in more of the 40 recommendations being used as world framework against bleaching of the capital. The GAFI also publishes a list of country not respecting the recommendations or not applying the resolutions of the United Nations. The list of the “Countries or Territories Not-Co-operative” (currently Egypt, Guatemala, the Philippines, Saint-Vincent and Grenadines) is reactualized with each full session of the GAFI.  Lastly, the Council decided several measurements of application of the law:  the Council envisages the constitution of an agency of control of the borders whose activities were to begin on May 1, 2005. Moreover, inclusion in the biometric passports of data became obligatory. In. connection   with the Commission, the Council adopted a program of solidarity to face the consequences of a terrorist attack. With this program, the Council in particular aims at improving protection of the crucial infrastructures for the whole of the territory as well as the management of crisis in the event of attacks for transborder purposes? In order to face chemical or biological attacks, the EU decided creation, in October 2001, of a committee of medical safety composed representatives of the Ministers for the health, which presented in December 2001 a program on the co-operation, the preparation and the reaction to the attacks by biological agents and chemical, indicated under the name of code BICHAT. This program aims at organizing the exchange of information, the detection and the identification of the chemical agents and biological, the creation of medical stocks and coordination in the event of attack. The whole of these measurements marks the beginning of European Homeland Security. The process seems indeed launched. The permeability of Schengen space and the multiplicity of the police forces and the systems of justice make it possible nevertheless to the terrorists to continue to operate relatively easily within the EU. For this reason, there remains still work to make to harmonize the legislations and to strengthen the co-operation.
Here are the five paramount fields: (1) the European warrant for arrest: If there is already cases where this mandate was already implemented, in particular after the attacks from March 11, 2004 in Madrid, of the reserves persist on behalf of the States with respect to this instrument: June 1, 2004 for example, the court of Pau refused the extradition towards Spain of three members of a Basque independence group, considering that the infringements had been made partly in France. (2) Europol: The increase in competences and the means of Europol did not result in convincing results. The organization requires to be equipped with true operational competences, which requires as a preliminary the constitution of a clearer decision-making centre and the reinforcement of the control as well jurisdictional as parliamentary of this organization. It is also necessary to equip Europol of more than experts linguists likely to understand the rare, essential languages to analyze the intercepted communications and to infiltrate the terrorist networks. With regard to the task force, this structure did not succeed, according to opinion’s of the experts, with truly being essential on many the other structures existantes.(3) Eurojust: Eurojust remains a modest organization of around fifty of people without true capacities. To improve its effectiveness, which depends today on the co-operation of the national authorities, it is necessary to institute an institutional link between this institution and Europol. Eurojust could for example be in charge of legal control on the operational activities of Europol. (4) Information: If the structures installation facilitate the exchanges between services, it is obvious that the analysis and the forecast of the risks could be improved within a common framework, for example by reinforcing the capacity of the secretariat-general of the Council to process the confidential data. Beyond a better co-operation – obviously necessary, in particular within sight of the surprise which the attacks of London of July 2005 caused – a question much major appears: Does Europe, want to really profit a total co-operation – undoubtedly illusory – European services of information or even the setting-up from the European “CIA” Since always, the question of the services of information and that of the information flow constitute a significant subject; because it is recipient of the heart of the sovereignty of each State, because it touches with the most secret means of the information and the political action of these States but also of the individuals who direct them. On the whole, it is well the question of the degree of autonomy of each State with respect to its partners which is posed. Then begin yourself on this subject a perhaps revealing debate of the real statute that the State-Nations grant to the Union when elements among most fundamental of their official sovereignty are concerned. (5) To reinforce the coherence of the European strategy: The European Union should formulate an own
strategy of territorial sanctuarisation . That would suppose to carry out a strategic reflexion on the priority fields which would have been identified. It would be then easier to determine measurements than it would be advisable to initiate at the European level, in the respect of the principle of subsidiarity and in a spirit of complementarity with the properly national actions. Beyond, the appointment of a coordinator of the “homeland defense” could also reinforce coherence between the various measurements taken under the supervision of the various pillars and by the national ministries.
The coordinator should refer about it directly to the Foreign Minister (if the Union would obtain such a person in charge) and with the Council of the general affairs and foreign relations. Response in the event of attack: owing to the fact that a possible aggression could quickly create transborder problems, the improvement of the operational preparation of the forces of safety civil-soldiers is necessary to answer in a way coordinated a radiological, chemical or bacteriological attack terrorist. One could also consider a “pool” of military units specialized in civil protection, indicated by the Member States to carry out programs of joint drive. Beyond these precise proposals, the EU must especially reflect on three stakes of the field of interior safety in order to be able to build true a European homeland defense.

The protection of the basic rights visa-vis to the terrorists who instrumentals  freedom specific to the Western democracies, the authorities are seen forced to take severe measures to prevent the attacks of the latter. Under pretext of protect itself from these aggressions which threaten the constitutional principles, temptation is large to reduce in the unquestionable facts of the individual rights of the citizens. If it is true that fundamental freedoms will not be able to remain without safety, the safeguarding of the civil laws remains nevertheless essential to preserve the democracy itself. By proclaiming the exceptionnality of terrorism, the authorities took the practice to answer by the restriction or the suspension of public freedoms and certain constitutional guarantees (for example, the limitation of the rights of marked). They can also transgress the principle of separation of the capacities for the benefit of the executive (for example, the transfer of jurisdictional competences to the police authorities). The emergency regulations adopted since September 11 in the Western democracies, like the law anti-terrorist (Terrorist Act) in England, the retention under not very transparent conditions of suspects in Guantanamo, draw especially the attention to the discriminatory treatments whose mainly the people of foreign origin suffer whose forces of safety measures think that they could possibly have a bond with actors of terrorism. More largely, it is the installation under pretext of terrorism in our democracies of a true security firm combining full uses of new technologies of observation, localization, treatment and setting in network of the data, which offer in an unhoped-for way their contest; and reactivation of ancestral fears mobilizing our most antiquated reflexes which is concerned. All these elements were considered by the originators of contemporary terrorism. They contribute to “the action leverage” formidable which offers today the mode of terrorist action to be made hear on the world scene, to make evolve/move the dominant representations which prevail on the chess-board geostrategic, and finally to modify the course of each one of our existences.  The shared responsibilities between the fields police officer and soldier Within the EU, the sensitivity of each country with respect to the stakes of safety are varied, just as the task sharing between the fields soldier and police officer. In the countries equipped with a military-police force like the “French gendarmerie” (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Netherlands), the soldiers take – in the respect of the existing laws – a certain number of responsibilities in interior safety. They for example are implied in the protection of the territory and the significant points. On the other hand, in the Scandinavian countries, the deployment of the forces armed to ensure the internal safety is not envisaged. The transfer to the military authority of the policing powers is often seen in these last countries like a transgression of the principle of separation of the capacities. How to conceive under these conditions a harmonized vision of a homeland European defense? There all the extent of the task is measured, and it at the very least seems necessary to initiate a basic dialogue on the future role of the military sector in the protection of the territory in Europe. Obviously the patrols of monitoring and the defense of the significant points concern certainly still for a long time the national level, but it to remain about it not less necessary to engage a reflexion on the role which such force at the European federal level could have. C.) The institutional system of the three pillars of Amsterdam the problem of the obliteration of the border enters interior safety and external safety did not find yet a translation in the institutional structure of the Union. To take up the challenge of the harmonization and the coordination of the efforts for a better interior safety in the EU is very largely complicated by the existence of three separate pillars. The activities of the internal and external agencies remain often dispersed because of persistent obstacles. Thus on close subjects there are often two working groups: for example

III   Cooperation IN EUROPEAN UNION
The institutional anti-terrorism cooperation which is coordinated by the TWG
The ‘Counter Terrorism Working Group’  is responsible for safety external in the framework of the PESC ( defined as Politique Europeée pour securité et cooperation)and the PESD(defined as politique europeene pour securité et defence)
In do the species, these three procedural contexts divergent constitute a sufficiently optimal answer to effectively prevent and face with the permanent threat of the terrorism which terrorism lets plane on Europe There are still sometimes strong reserves within the national administrations with respect to the idea of a homeland European defense. It seems difficult to consider that the Commission acquires a capacity in the immediate future to be legislated on such significant subjects, which touch so much with the rights of the individuals and the substance even of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, vis-à-vis with a European space which shares the risks and the threats and a more and more inter-connected world, not to advance Community integration in the field of interior safety could prove to be detrimental with means-term.

The fight counters the terrorist networks with  the fight against terrorism beyond the European borders should take into account the new characteristics lying in the terrorist threat. Sight the importance of the foreign politics in the fight anti-terrorist, the European Union should endeavor to propose, in a clear and decisive way, the construction of a reflective action and clean on the international scene. The adoption of the European strategy of safety (baptized the “paper of Solana”) at the time of the European Council of December 12, 2003 represents the first attempt at a common description of the strategic environment of Europe and its consequences for the Union. Even it is not a question itself of true “strategic doctrines”, but rather of a whole of guiding principles, the objectives of long term and the general way to reach them from now on are clearly specified. With regard to the fight against terrorism, Europeans underline the value limit of the military interventions vis-a-vis to terrorism. The “preventive” war postulated by the Americans as universal cure against terrorism is called in question by Europeans. Not sanctioned by the international community, the war in Iraq thus started a serious crisis in the international political relations, of which one continues today still to collect the collateral effects (attacks of London, risks destabilization with the Close relation and the Middle East, new tank of candidate to terrorism in Iraq, crisis nuclear in Iran and North Korea) Nevertheless, the EU estimates that the military interventions take importance in the situations where terrorism succeeded in acquiring a territory to develop infrastructures to with it (dies of recruitment, laboratories, headquarters). The best example remains Afghanistan where the military intervention put an end to the activities of many bunches terrorist supported by the mode of the Talibans. Thus, the extraordinary European Council of September 11, 2001 recognized the legitimacy of the American intervention in Afghanistan and accepted that the Member States of the Union take part in it according to their capacities. For the first time the EU thus considers an intervention military necessary to answer a terrorist attack. The European Parliament and the temporary European Assembly of safety and defense also asked after September 11 for the revision of the missions of Petersberg, as well as European policy of safety and defense (PESD) in order to formally include there the fight against terrorism. To carry out such operations, Europe must get means to be able to use the force in the event of need. The experiment of the intervention in Kosovo already showed the need for a truly autonomous common defense. Since, the PESD made progress at the same time in term of objectives and implementation operational: decision to create a force of 60 000 projectable and spreadable men for one one year minimal duration (Headline Goals adopted in Helsinki in December 2001), development of “tactical groupings” of 1500 men for operations of fast reaction from here 2007, accumulation of experiment of operations carried out under the aegis of the European Union with or without NATO around Europe or out of our continent. However, it should be noted that the EU has a long way to traverse if it wants to be able to support effectively the American army in particular in the logistic plan. In fact, the EU does not have yet military forces nor of operational structures in a position to prepare and implement an operation of the scale of “immutable Freedom”. To make the PESD operational, it is necessary to cure its persistent gaps. “immutable Freedom” thus showed the lack bursting of air means of projection and tactical transport as well as the deficit of informational capacities. Moreover, it is necessary to have more mobile forces and more integrated special forces. However, the lack of common political good-will, joined to the financial implications that such a prospect raises, makes at the very least difficult the rapid hardening of measurements adequate. In this context, the harmonization of the mechanisms of acquisition seems to be essential to be able to take up the challenges which poses with the armies the new strategic context and the evolution of communication and information technologies. Beyond the direct interventions, the strategy of defense and common safety must underline the need for Europe for supporting the failing States in the construction of a legitimate official authority. Thus it rests with the political structures which judge to have legitimacy to take share with the division of the burden of the safeguarding of the total balance of the world, to take measures intended to prevent a territory from becoming a sanctuary for the terrorists. In this context the EU has obviously a great role to play, and must thus prepare there with determination. The EU adheres to a broad design of the safety, of which the ambition is to sweep a big part of the spectrum of the modes of action, from the fast military intervention to the maintenance of peace to as well as the restoration of the democracy. One rediscovers today in Afghanistan – and by contrast in Iraq – all the importance of this total assumption of responsibility of the cycle of intervention to ensure the durable success of an operation. Actually Europeans appear placed well to contribute to the efforts of consolidation of the States thanks to their experiments and to their know-how in this field. The first operation of management of crisis of the EU was launched to Bosnia and Herzegovina with the mission of police force EUPM. The forces ensure the follow-up of the current operation of UNO with a three years mandate and the objective to set up of the local capacities of police force. It is in addition increasingly important to ensure the good course of the transitional periods enters military interventions and the catch of load by the civil forces. It thus appeared necessary to have a force specialized in the management of the conflicts and the maintenance of law and order at the European level. In comparison with the various European cultures, the question of the statute – soldier or civil – arises in a thorny way. In Germany and in the majority of the Scandinavian countries, the maintenance of law and order is ensured by police forces especially formed for such interventions. Force is to note that there are relevant examples to prove the success of their interventions, as it is the case of operation EUPM. On the other hand, the countries having gendarmeries decided the creation of a Force of European Gendarmerie (FGE). This concept of European gendarmerie has the advantage of emphasizing a double culture which binds defense and interior safety; it rests on a design of flexibility and mobility that the forces of civil safety do not have as the police force. Indeed, vis-à-vis with the terrorist phenomenon, the capacity to pass from a posture of maintenance of law and order to a posture of coercion is essential. Moreover, the gendarmerie could be used as regulator between the military field and the civil company, ONG and the persistent institutional structures. For the army, such missions could in the future constitute a crucial part of their contribution to the fight against terrorism.

III. 1: Towards a European foreign politics?
Beyond the military prospect, Europe must endeavor to find points of convergence which would enable him to follow a true antiterrorist foreign politics. The EU in particular decided to reinforce the action and the means of the United Nations and other regional organizations (SOEC, African Union etc). The following initiatives outline what could be such a foreign  co-operation bi- and multilateral politics.The EU points finger the need for a close co-operation with partner-thirds in order to harmonize the efforts and to promote a total solution. It allots a crucial importance to the co-operation with the United States which intensified since the declaration Euro Atlantic  of 2004 on the antiterrorist fight. It is especially in the field of the prevention of the financing of terrorism that several interesting initiatives were launched. Moreover, the EU promised to increase its efforts in order to propose a technical aid against terrorism with third countries. It finally decided to insert an antiterrorist clause in the agreements with third countries? Cultural dialogue: According to the European Council of Brussels of September 2001, the fight anti-terrorist should be based on a cultural dialogue with the countries and the areas of the world where terrorism develops. The going beyond of the cultural borders is indeed a major element to fight effectively against the drifts of terrorism and to prevent a climbing of violence. The revival of the process of Barcelona at the time of the Conference of Valence of April 2002 plays in this context an important part. Was a regional program equipped with a financial assistance approved there, including measurements to strengthen the co-operation in the fight against terrorism? The resolution of the conflicts: One of the European priorities of the antiterrorist fight is the resolution of the conflicts which are used as composts with terrorist propaganda, like the conflicts of the Middle East, Chechnya or the Cashmere. Especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which represents one of the reasons – among others – for rallying to the fundamentalist cause. In does October 2001, the European Council confirm the position of the EU aspiring to a payment political, founded on the establishment of a Palestinian State and the right of Israel to live in peace? The management of the crises and prevention of the conflicts: The EU can benefit from its experiment in the field of the management of the crises and the prevention of the conflicts while being pressed on a range of instruments like the traditional diplomacy, the development co-operation or the marketing policy. The European policy of development aid seems to be in this respect the most powerful instrument in the long run. Beyond, the European Union has led for several years of the concrete actions, on the ground, to accompany the exits by crisis. By financing the construction of schools or medical infrastructures, the European Union tries to directly improve the living conditions of the populations tested by a conflict, as in Bosnia or in Kampuchea. All these initiatives show that there is a certain framework so that a European foreign politics supported on the common values of the Member States develops, such as the multilateral co-operation, the respect of the international law, the tolerance and the dialogue. However, in spite of this common base, the initiatives of the European Union on the international scene remain often limited for three essential reasons: (1) the rotation of the presidencies: In the field of the conceptualization of a foreign politics, the effectiveness is often restricted by the changing perspectives  of the various semi-annual presidencies. (2) Insufficiencies of some of its devices of fast reaction: The European Union should be able to react more quickly to the requests emanating for States in the process of destabilization. For that, a fast mechanism of reaction was already created in 2001 to make it possible the Commission to carry out operations of very short duration. Nevertheless, this mechanism should be reinforced substantially and equipped with means necessary. (3) Its weaknesses as regards diplomacy of ground: It would be in the same way desirable as the EU supports the diplomacy “of ground”, i.e. the work of prevention and peaceful payment of the conflicts achieved on the ground by the actors of the civil company. In this context, the introduction of teams of mediators, front, during and after a conflict, in parallel with the more traditional instruments which already exist would be a concrete track to deepen. The European foreign politics is often subjected to criticism, because the Union has many difficulties of federating the national wills and of making converge the foreign politics of each Member State. Perhaps beyond, a solution for European Defense lies in the establishment of reinforced co-operations. In spite of the failure of the adoption of the Constitution, the reinforced co-operations (to be distinguished from the privileged statute of structured co-operation that would have granted such a hard core the constitutional Treaty) represent for certain countries the possibility of accelerating significantly the process of institutionalization of the common foreign politics and from Europe of defense, while escaping from the intergovernmental logic classically implemented by the traditional diplomacy and the Council.
In conclusion, September 11 and the attacks of Madrid encouraged the Union to accelerate integration in many fields. Concerning the files of European interior safety, one attends the emergence of true a homeland defense. Nevertheless, it remains to cure many gaps, particularly as regards legal harmonization (monitoring of the borders, information etc). Lastly, the EU did not represent yet in its structures progressive but inexorable screening of the border between interior safety and external defense. It is the structure even of the three pillars which should be the subject of a debate. Acting of the possibilities of apprehending terrorists abroad, the Union identified two situations in which an intervention seems useful: fight against territorial terrorism and helps in the failing States. For that, the EU must equip the PESD with adequate means. It especially became imperative to have a European force specialized in the maintenance of law and order. In this respect, the European gendarmerie could be used as reference to such a projectable  police force. With regard to a European foreign politics vis-à-vis with terrorism, the EU operated a subtle evolution with the “Solana Doctrines”. But if Europeans want to acquire a responsibility on a worldwide scale, it is necessary to translate this will by concrete actions and to form a foreign politics and a European defense truly common. Conversely, the organization of the Union in this matter translates today the divergent interests of the 25 Member States which make it up. For some, the reinforced co-operations then represent the only possibility of advancing integration necessary in the field of the foreign politics. More largely, if the European Union is well placed to develop a global vision of safety and to identify the instruments necessary to preserve it without compromising the projections of the Western democracies, it seems that the approach and the gasoline even of the terrorist phenomenon pose in a crucial way with the Member States the question of the ultimate purposes of a common foreign politics in Europe. From there rises a broader but corollary interrogation from the preceding one: that of the place of the European authorities in the strategy of the State-Nations.

III.2:Terrorism and universalization
The co-operation, response to the transnational threat Vis-a-vis with that, the States tend to be organized. Collective answers are worked out. Little by little, in spite of the legal difficulties and policies an apparatus of fight is set up. The European Union occupies from now on a place of choice there. The new nature of terrorism the new nature of terrorism falls under the total change of the world at the end of the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the completion of universalization. But it is also due to a change socio-policy touching in the conditions of emergence of these groups and with their constitution. In this new configuration terrorism resulting from the radical islamist groups plays a preeminent part. One left the logic of the groups structured to explicit and political claim to see appearing a new generation of transnational combatants resulting from the schools of Afghanistan and Pakistani border with the generic and universal watchwords and, therefore, blurs. This globalization of the contents of the message removed the old dialogue which conveyed the attack, political violence, between the State and the terrorist.
It thus acts of a war without mercy which was declared by a group of people determined not at a particular company (the Western company) but, within each company, with those which do not share their “values”. This situation makes burst the conceptual limits between the concept of terrorism and war. The factor which contributed much to the transnationalisation of terrorism will have been the defeat of the revolutionary islamist movements on the territorial/national plan. In fact, the fight engaged since the beginning of the years 1980 by certain numbers of groups (with the imitation of the Iranian revolution) against the States of which they belonged  (Moslem Brothers in Egypt, radical Chiites in Syria and Iraq, radical groups in Tunisia and Libya, GIA and others in a massive way in Algeria, and to a lesser extent in other countries as Morocco) showed a shingling failure overall. This local defeat led the survivors of these movements to be grouped under the Al Qaida banner while benefiting from the transnational intellectual community which represent of the radical groups of ultra thought as Takfir Wal Hijra or Hizb Al Tahrir.2 the allegiance with an organization supra national is often purely formal. Al Qaida and Ben Laden more represent a sign, a “frankness”  good more than one structured and bureaucratic organization such as it was obligingly shown after September 11 by journalists and American analysts in evil of sensational. This flexibility of the organization and its abstract character, does not weaken its dangerously . It makes it more difficult on the contrary to include/understand and fight. Europe (of north primarily: The United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden) were the refuge, sometimes obliging of these groups and the seat of their logistics, like showed it dismantling which followed the attacks. In addition, of the sociological evolutions which appeared with universalization, made jump the barriers between organized crime and terrorism and make difficult the characterization of these new groups. The financial deregulation brought with it the experts of the skirting of the national taxation rules as well as the international circuits of the traffics in any kind. Because, around of the traffic of drug, articulate a galaxy of traffics subordinates (human cigarettes, cars, weapons, people, etc). In addition, often behind caritative appearances, organizations of support for terrorist continuing of the universalists goals or sectoral activities were organized. The events of September 11 showed that the islamist terrorist networks rested on partially caritative organizations (Islamic foundations etc). These same networks being financed with the traffics of all kinds. These transverse groups, these “ONG criminalo/terrorists” which live in margin of the State and the international system, when they do not fight it directly, combine modern management of the criminal action with political and/or religious justifications. By defending their positions by the weapons, they copy, singent, sometimes very effectively, the States by asserting the exclusive use of violence. This one generally takes the shape of terrorism with increased technical capabilities, and/or of guerrilla (Maffias Colombian or Russian, luminous Sentier, Al Qaida, etc). One can name this new actor who transcends all the traditional categories (political group, Maffia, sect, etc.) : MPPTM, is: gangster This protagonist of the universalization which controls a notable share of world finance cannot any more be ignored and returned to an exclusively police treatment and must be thought overall and statistically. The change is also exerted in the sociological order. The new terrorists, in particular the militants of radical Islam who are more “transnational” recruit from now on in the scientific and technical of world arabo-Moslem and Western universities, in particular at certain immigrants of the third generation badly in their skin. One then left the summary attack to go towards that of the conceptual sophistication. One will go perhaps later in that of the technical sophistication. This conjunction between an intellectual level of foreground, a will without fault and the choice of the sacrifice returns these extremely dangerous men and these groups. Lastly, it is necessary to put forward the insertion of these groups in the universalization and the exploitation of this one for their profit. This insertion is done on two levels. On the one hand, by the connection of the disparate groups which are composed, recompose themselves and communicate by the sophisticated use of the Internet and the world fabric. In addition, these groups exploit the faults of the financial globalisation by developing their treasure of war on the offshore money markets and the tax havens. This returns to the organization of a true international co-operation and, at the end of the hypocrisy of the States with respect to the advantages or supposed such of the permanence of these zones of not-right to surface of planet.

III.3. INTERNATIONAL ARENA
This globalisation of the contents of the message removes the dialogue which the attack hitherto conveyed between the State and the terrorist. Not awaiting more tangible answer of the adversary, this one can leave free course with the most destroying impulses towards the most varied targets. That does nothing but increase the probability of threats of terrorism nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical (NRBC). One thus sees appearing new groups whose majority refer to a canted design of Islam closer to the apocalyptic sect than of the political movements and able to implement a “hyperterrorism” combining the will of sacrifice of its executants, the power and the sophistication of some of its tools and the fluidity of its networks. . September 11, 2001 thus corresponds to the development of “a new” terrorism which, can be summarized with these characteristics: – its “deterritoriality”: its bases are generally established in countries whose often State misses or weakened but its networks and its logistics are in Europe, but also in Asia and North America and of the South; – its “dematerialization”: the value symbolic system (and media) of its targets is often higher than their actual value and its communication passes by Internet; – its apparent and “depoliticization attends”: its announced or suspected reasons are often monks and/or cultural (or amalgamating the policy in the monk), and the apparent lack of political claim concretes prohibited any negotiation; – Its pitiless character: police force and civil is confused in a blind violence. The massive elimination of civil seems on the contrary a tool aiming “to terrorize” the public opinion more and “to convince” of a will without fault and a point of nonreturn. This one is reinforced by the suicidal step. The methods, organizations and means of fight against these acts must be adapted to these new characteristics. A continuous action (to be ready and avoid the surprises) and on the long term (in particular in prevention) is all the more essential as the terrorist groups form part of universalization on two levels to exploit it with their profit: – by the connection of these disparate groups, “franchized” which are composed, recompose themselves and communicate by a sophisticated use of the Internet (camouflage and deception), – by the exploitation of the faults of the financial globalisation which enables them to develop on the financial places offshore oil rig and paradises their treasure of war , which is also fed by small traffics using of multiple channels particularly difficult to detect. Policies of fight at the international level: an apparatus stammering During years, the fight against terrorism ran up at the international level with a problem of definition. All the initiatives in about thirty year ridged on the distinction terrorisme/lutte national release. In other words of many countries wanted to condemn terrorism well but not that used within the framework of resistance to a colonial oppression for example (cf the war of Algeria) – the aforementioned means not being able to be qualified “terrorists” even if they borrowed the same ways (attacks, exactions towards the civil ones, destruction of goods and infrastructures, etc). Also, with the accelerated development of the attacks and other diversions of plane at the beginning of the years 1960, the United Nations could find like substitute with this problem only the judgment of precise acts and not their qualification. Thus condemned the your diversions of aircraft, the taking of hostages, the use of explosives, etc. 14 conventions were signed until the 11 September. On its side, the Council of Europe made large conceptual efforts without those leading to operational decisions. European convention for the repression of the terrorism of 1977 which can, in all connections, being considered in spite of the real absence of effects as the text founder of an international reflexion on this subject brûlant. the element the most important attached with this convention is the fact of denying any political character with the acts of terrorism (article 1: “none the infringements mentioned hereafter will be regarded as a political infringement…”) It is thus on September 11 2001 which made make a considerable qualitative jump with the international legal instruments of fight against terrorism.
The resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, without however defining the concept of terrorism requires of the States to collaborate urgently to prevent and repress the acts of terrorism”. It also preaches for each State a duty of abstention to organize and to encourage acts of terrorism on the territory of another State, there to help or in it to take part, or to tolerate on its territory of the activities organized in order to perpetrate such acts” the financing of terrorism is also proscribed and implies the freezing of the clandestine assets (Article 1.a and c), just like the right of asylum. The resolution invites to a larger co-operation in the information and notes (innovative element) the bond with organized criminality, drug and bleaching, the traffic of weapons and the illegal transfer of nuclear matters chemical biological, joining in that our own conclusions on the appearance of new actor MPPTM. Finally one cannot conclude on the fight anti-terrorist at the international level without recalling the initiatives of G8 on the financing of terrorism (G7, top of October 2001 T G8 November 2001), terrorism nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological (NRBC), financing of terrorism (GAFI – October 2001), the information system security, the safety of transport, the control of the conteneurs10; those of the SOEC which adopted a political declaration including/understanding an action plan incentive in particular to the exchange of information and the training of police officers; those of NATO which set up programs of information and follow-up of the proliferation of the weapons of massive destruction in bond with terrorism as well as programs of defense starting from considerable military competence on the matter (detection, protection, etc). In spite of many resistances, shy persons measurements were taken right now to reinforce the legal, police and financial means of fight at the European level against terrorism. The European efforts: the “good ahead” of after September 11 was an electric shock also for the Member States of the European Union.

III.4. Council of Laeken
The top of Laeken in December 2001 advanced a considerable number of file blocked since of the years because of the frivolity of the governments. The police and legal co-operation was the principal one. But, especially, the harmonization of the fight against terrorism took a considerable step ahead. – a European definition of terrorism and its demonstrations the proposal for a decision tallies relating to the fight against the terrorism of the European Council adopted at the top of Laeken December the 14, and 15 2001 and definitively adopted with at the time of the European Council of Seville of June 21-22, 2002, fixes a legal framework of action against terrorism. In this respect, the EU further goes than UNO since it gives a definition of terrorism in its article 3: . Each Member State takes measurements necessary to make so that following infringements, defined by its national law, made intentionally by (it is we who underline) an individual or a group against one or more country, their institutions or their population, and aiming threatening them and carrying seriously reached or at destroying the political, economic or social structures of a country, are sanctioned like terrorist infringements: (A) the murder; (b) physical injuries; (c) I’ removal or the catch of hostages; (d) blackmail; (e) simple or qualified flight; (f) the illicit capture of official or governmental installations, public good and public place, infrastructure, means of transport or the damage which is caused to them; (g) manufacture, possession,  acquisition, the transport or supply of weapons or explosives; (h) release of contaminant substances, or the provocation of fires, floods or explosions, the setting in danger of people, goods, animals or the environment; (i) the disturbance or the interruption of the provisioning of water, electricity or any other fundamental resource; (j) commission of attacks by disturbing an information system; (k) the threat to make one of the infringements enumerated above; (l) direction of a terrorist group;. 2 For purposes of present decision-tallies, one understands by “terrorist group” a structured association, of more than two people, established in time, and acting in a way concerted in order to commit the terrorist offences cited in paragraph 1, items a) with K). “These elements were definitively act in decision-taken of the Council of June 13, 2002 relating to the fight against terrorism adopted with the European Council of Séville.11 They are found in the final text in a slightly different form in articles 1/11 and 2/1. The EU thus has a framework of action from which the public action can be committed. The scale of the sorrows which had been specified in the project of Laeken (from 2 to 20 years with the possibility of applying aggravating circumstances because of the particularly cruel character of the act, the number of people concerned, its persistence [ which can relate to the radiological and biological attacks ] or aiming at the Heads of States and governments, the elected officials and other civils servant legal or police.) is returned more flexibly to the national legislations in the final text which specifies than the Member States take measures so that the incurred sorrows are not lower than fifteen and eight years for the most serious cases.
Finally the joint Position of the Council “relating to the application of specific measures in order to fight against terrorism” and the Payment “concerning the adoption of restrictive measurements specific against certain people and entities within the framework to the fight against terrorism” fix at the same time the definitions and qualifications suggested by the proposal of decision-tallies of Laeken/Séville, the fight against the financing of terrorism and, especially, the joint position of the Council gives in appendix a list (revised several times) people and groups directly aimed by these measures. These groups, whose list is not restrictive, are initially of European origin: Basque, Spanish, Irish and Greek, but one finds there also the branch armed with Hamas (Ezzedine Al Kassem) and Islamic Jihad Palestinian. This initiative, which was the subject of wild negotiations between Member States, is rather incomplete (paradoxically Al Qaida does not appear pas14 there) but is essentially evolutionary. It slices with the former practice refusing to indicate personal “targets” with the European actions as regards safety or defense. Lastly, one cannot miss evoking the specific fight counters biological terrorism. Following the American aggressions of next 5 October and and thousands of letters “hoaxes” which were sent in Europe and elsewhere (more than 4000 at the end of 2002 for only France), the European Union set up a biological “Task force” which aims at making the state of the threat and works on the evaluation and the coordination of the means available in the event of attack on the European ground. This initiative is only with its first steps.

IV.Practical Measures
IV.1.Measurements of a legal and police nature (Europol)
In the 3rd pillar “Justice and Interior Businesses” (JAI) of the EU, of significant progress have been accomplished for a few years, and the events of September 11 accelerated the rate/rhythm of it. Europol plays the part of a bank of data centralized. Creation in 1999 of a “European Office of police force” (Europol) aimed “to improve the effectiveness of the qualified services of the Member States and their co-operation with regard to the prevention and the fight against terrorism, the illicit traffic of narcotics, etc.” Each country set up a “national unit” in charge of the connection with Europol which manages data bases on the suspected people, but who is not the place of exchanges deepened between “services” on the terrorist threat.
Europol is a modest organization which is not any operational responsible for police force (objective 350 people including 44 liaison officers with all the European services concerned). However, the Member States decided to modify the role of Europol and to set up of the common teams of investigation on terrorism, the traffic of drug and the draft of the human beings. Convention aiming at creating Eurojust, organization which will be made up prosecutors, magistrates or equivalents, detached by each Member State, is being negotiated as well as the European warrant for arrest. Eurojust functions in a provisional form since March 2001. It is a modest organization of around fifty of people which will contribute to the coordination of the European legal authorities and will bring its contest “in the investigations relating to the businesses of transborder criminality engraves [... ] by holding account in particular analyses carried out by Europol”. The installation of the European warrant for arrest decided Laeken and to adopted with Séville is also a major stage because it removes the political control which traditionally accompanies the procedures by extradition. Eurojust and the European warrant for arrest which aims 32 infringements graves should be essential elements of the fight European anti-terrorist. Lastly, the joint definition of the concept of terrorism and the acts which constitute it is a considerable step crossed by the Union in December 2002, for a true harmonized policy of fight against this plague.

IV.2.  Measurements of a nature economic and financial (TRACFIN – GAFI) the European Union started to set up a European policy as regards money bleaching: – Adoption in June 2001 of decision-tallies concerning the money bleaching, the identification, tracking, freezing or the seizure and the confiscation of the instruments. Adoption in October 2001 of one protocol to the Convention on the legal penal matter mutual aid. This agreement poses the principle of the in opposability of the bank secrecy and the tax reason at the requests of international co-operation. Payment of the Council of December 27 to the freezing of the assets and the elements of proof, which must make it possible to make carry out a precautionary measure, such as a seizure, in another Member State. Lastly, the EU supports work of the GAFI (Group of international financial action), depend on G7M/G8, concerning the non-co-operative countries and territories, and it takes part in the revision in the course of 40 recommendations of the GAFI. In October 2001, the scope of this last were extended to the financing of terrorism and it recently defined new international standards to fight against this one. The action against the financing of terrorism is not simply the fight against bleaching; in the case of Al-Qaida, it acts especially of “clean money blackening”, that they are the credits of Bin Laden or the money collection by “caritative” organizations. It should be noted that the first response with the attacks of September 11, before the release of military operations, was of a financial nature: freezing in the United States as of the end of September 2001 of the assets of 27 organizations or individuals, blocking of the deposits or transactions on the American ground of the foreign banks which would refuse to cooperate. This black list enacted by the United States was shown immediately by Europeans: it was a question “of sapping the financial foundations of the terrorists” according to president Bush
The effectiveness of the adopted measures will obviously depend on the political good-will their authors, and the power of the implied interests will undoubtedly require a constant pressure of the public opinions on their governments.
The coordination of the information coordination between European services of information in the field of anti-terrorism is practiced within the framework of more or less formal forums.

Most important is the group TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, extremism and International Violence), created in 1975, which brings together the Ministers concerned for the EU with an aim of strengthening the police co-operation; divided into six working groups, it organizes exchanges of information and harmonizes the European legislations. The second forum is the club of Bern, which gathers 19 country including the 15 of the EU; this organization is the framework many meetings, organized by topics, of small abstract groups of which the number of participants is decided with individually. These forums allow exchanges between services, but there is not, for the moment, of evaluation common to the profit of a European political authority. Tracks for a reinforced co-operation the events of September 11, in a certain manner, represents a chance to set up true policies of co-operation. The co-operation as regards counter-terrorism is finally only the emerged face of the iceberg. A part of the causes of the crisis of identity and/or company which certain countries or certain populations live refer to causes overall generally finding their roots in socio-economic problems or political crises of confidence. The European Union E must then: – To jointly lay down a policy of co-operation and durable development allowing him to offer another way to the victims of excesses of the market, .

V.   CONCLUSIONS?
To set up means allowing to promote this policy in the international authorities (UNO, SOEC, OMC, OECD, NATO, etc.) to develop a  strategy of influence and the assistance with the reinforcement of the regional organizations (UMA, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere), engagements close as regards development aid, the expression of the objectives to short, average and long term of the financings in the zones of crisis and the control of these funds, etc. The talk of this fast evolution facilitated by the shock of September 11, 2001 should not push us to publish an official statement of victory. Much remains to be made. Observers as attentive as Jean-Louis Bruguiere judge notes as if the exchange of bilateral information is relatively satisfactory, the institutional co-operation remains poor and if the police force and the services specialized cooperate better and better, the legal co-operation is still completely insufficient. In addition, among the weaknesses noted in the fight against terrorism, the evaluation made by the United Nations in 2002 revealed that the fight against “terrorist finance” remained the weak point of the device. One of the best analysts of the terrorist financial networks, Richard Labévière, could indicate that there was can be a bond between the slowness of the investigations and bonds economic existing for a long time between the Ben Laden family and the Bush 18family… One will need a little time to check if this causality is diriment. Though it is, the rise of transnational terrorism seems from now on one of the features characteristic of the new century. The fight, in this field, between the sword and the shield does nothing but start.

For one year, Europeans have thus reacted as much to the American reaction to terrorism that with the terrorist threat itself. Admittedly, the European dynamism is related also to expiries very others, in particular the imminence of widening and work of Convention on the future of the Union. But, of these two factors of evolution, it is without question America which, in 2002, played the driving part. Another America Three words summarize the reaction of the United States to international terrorism: urgency, militarization, unilateralism. The upheaval of the American strategic priorities was as brutal as immediate. Wounded in the heart of their power, conscious from now on of their vulnerability structural to the perverse aspects of universalization, the United States placed the fight against the terrorism and the defense of the country at the row of absolute priorities. The remainder – in particular the stabilization of the crises in Europe, traditional tasks of maintenance of peace, even the whole of the questions of European safety – became completely secondary. Admittedly, this orientation existed before (“the superpowers do not do the housework”, said already the advisers of the Bush candidate). But the innovation of terrorism, it is to have transformed this tendency into concrete policy. The reaction  of the American response to terrorism is, in addition, impressive. 48 billion dollars of increase in the budget of the Pentagon in 2002, is a military expenditure of a billion dollar per day, 37 billion dollars in 2003 for the program Homeland Security, these figures translate better than any speech obsession technologic-soldier of America in the construction of a total response to the new threat. Sometimes so much so that this choice of the military whole seems to hold place of policy: the acceleration of the anti-missile programs of defense replaces the diplomatic efforts of fight against the nuclear proliferation; the calculation of divisions and other military capacities of the allies becomes the essential base of the American strategies of alliances or coalitions… Lastly, the refusal of very forced political very quickly was essential like code of conduct of the United States. The visceral repulsion with regard to the multilateralism, which it acts of the arms control, the environment, UNO and – great innovation – NATO itself, is undoubtedly their evolution more striking, and more diverting for the European allies. Refusal of the Treaty on the prohibition of the nuclear tests, of the protocol of Kyoto on the climate, of the international penal Court, America is placed above the international law when this right does not coincide with its own objectives. On the military level, this worship of the unilateralism implies to carry out, lead and control only the antiterrorist operations, without negotiating with possible allied list of the targets or the limits of the engaged operation, as it was the case during the air programs in Kosovo. These evolutions naturally modified the attitude of the United States with regard to their European allies. First of all, Europe from now on is evaluated on the only basis of the military capacities available, and the transatlantic debate is reduced systematically to the problems of the technological between the European armies and American difference. Among all American persons in charge, the denunciation of the obsolescence and maladjustment of the European armies on the one hand, weakness of the budgets of defense on the other hand, became an obliged topic. In a strategic species of tautology, the obsession of the military whole leads the United States to conclude with little utility Europeans, which feeds in return their tendency to the unilateralism: the allied forces are so ineffective that, even if America wished it, it could not cooperate with them; worse, the absence of interworking would complicate the task to him

References
WWW resources
http://www.un.org/terrorism/conventions.htm
European convention for terrorism repression27 January 1997, online at ; http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/FR/cadreprincipal.htm
Studies
Olivier Lepick Non-conventional Terrorrism, Presse Universitaire Francaise, Paris, 2003, Introducztion essay.
Richard V. LAbeviere ‘ Dollars of Terror-United States  and the Islamist Movements, Paris, 2003, Chapter 2
Council of  27 Dezember  2001, JOCE L344/93 of 28. 12. 2001
Main decision of 13 june 2002regarding European arrest mandate and procedures between member states  18.7.2002  in European Official Journal.
EU council from  Laeken, 14-15 december 2001.
Terrorism Threat and Responses, Genève, Occasional Paper Series, May 2001 ; pp 5-98.
Pierre Hassner, USA-from the empire of the force to the force of the empire, EU security studies Institute 2004
‘From Nice to Laeken : Fundamental paper of EU defence policy .A short analyse ‘by  Maartje Rutten, , pp25-86 avril 2002.PUF
Thérèse Delpech Chaos  Politics, Another face of the globalization, Paris, Le Seuil, 2002.
Robert Kagan: « Power and weakness », Policy Review, n° 113June 2002..

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